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The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open society.
—John Fitzgerald Kennedy1
At the writing of this volume in early 2019, there are 146 democracies
around the world—out of 195 states.2 These countries have held free
and fair elections, instituted market economies, and fostered the cre-
ation of civil societies. Some have endeavored to overhaul their intelli-
gence agencies,3 converting repressive state security systems into dem-
ocratic intelligence communities. Even the most successful democracies
face a conundrum in regard to the intelligence function, however:
whereas democracy calls for political neutrality, transparency, and
accountability, effective intelligence agencies must operate in secrecy. 
Democratic Systems
In general, the literature on democracy divides democratic systems
into two ideal types: electoral democracies, which are characterized
by free and fair elections, and liberal democracies, which involve free
and fair elections as well as the protection of individual, civil, and
political rights and freedoms of the citizenry.4 Moving from electoral
to liberal democracies equates to achieving democratic consolidation,
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whereas moving from liberal to electoral democracy status equates to
democratic deconsolidation or erosion.5
One of the most comprehensive conceptual frameworks of dem-
ocratic consolidation was advanced by scholars Juan Linz and Alfred
Stepan.6 In their view, democratic consolidation requires developing
five complementary and interacting arenas, operating within a func-
tioning state: (1) a free and lively civil society where citizens, groups,
and movements, generally independent of the state, associate to con-
vey shared ideas, concepts, interests, and values; (2) a relatively
autonomous and valued political society, whereby the polity arranges
itself to dispute the legitimate right to exercise control over public
power and state apparatus, and which includes political parties, elec-
tions, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and leg-
islatures; (3) rule of law, namely, a sense of constitutionalism and a
clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system
and supported by a strong legal culture in civil society; (4) a func-
tioning state bureaucracy in which the democratically elected govern-
ment wields its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in
the territory (command, regulate, extract) effectively to enforce law in
order to protect citizens’ rights and deliver other goods; and (5) insti-
tutionalized economic society, whereby sociopolitically crafted and
sociopolitically agreed-on norms, institutions, and regulations exist to
mediate between state and market.7 Countries that have successfully
developed these arenas are called consolidated democracies. Exam-
ples include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France,
Australia, Germany, and Japan, to name a few. Countries that have
started creating these institutions and ideas but have not been able to
develop them fully are called consolidating democracies. Examples
include Romania, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia, among others.
This volume discusses both consolidated and consolidating democra-
cies in the context of democratic societies.
The Intelligence-and-Democracy Dilemma 
Democratic societies seek liberty and security for their citizens. To
achieve these goals, they heed freedoms, rights, diversity, trans-
parency, accountability, and so on.8 They also craft intelligence agen-
cies to protect their national security and, ultimately, to maintain
their democratic trajectory.9
2 The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies
Paradoxically, however, to serve democracies, intelligence agen-
cies must engage in clandestine activities or exploit secret sources and
methods—measures that, on their face, do not comport with the open,
free society that democracies seek to sustain. Indeed, such activities
can pose a great danger to the democracy itself. Secrecy, for instance,
may accommodate abuse and insulate the agencies from scrutiny,
intrinsic or extrinsic. Problems of this sort have arisen in the United
States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, or Roma-
nia, to name a few—states where intelligence agencies operated with-
out a legal framework for decades.10 Secrecy and clandestine activities
augment the intelligence agencies’ power; they may refuse to serve
policy in favor of pursuing their own objectives. In one example, Ger-
many’s Federal Intelligence Service (the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or
BND) provided the United States with intelligence during the war in
Iraq in 2003, per existing agency-to-agency agreements, despite Ger-
man policymakers’ resolutely antiwar stance.11
Conversely, secrecy and clandestine activities may encourage
the politicization of the intelligence apparatus, which leads to mis-
use of intelligence agencies and their special privileges by the exec-
utive branch for its own political ends.12 There is abundant literature
on the politicization of intelligence in the United States and the
United Kingdom, in particular with regard to the intelligence lead-
ing up to the second invasion of Iraq.13 An extreme case of politi-
cization involves intelligence agencies acting as political police for
the government du jour.14 There have been scattered instances of
long-established democracies using intelligence agencies as political
police, in particular in the 1970s—including the US Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) monitoring American citizens, abuses by
Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) against the local
population in Quebec, the United Kingdom’s MI5 surveillance of
British citizens during the Thatcher government, and India’s intelli-
gence agencies’ arrest of tens of thousands of political opponents
and minorities without due process.15
Such measures are regularly employed by developing democra-
cies. In Indonesia, South Korea, Mongolia, Romania, Croatia, and
Albania, for example, the domestic intelligence agencies (and some-
times the foreign or military intelligence agencies) have regularly
conducted surveillance of members of the opposition and journal-
ists—most frequently during elections—as directed by the respec-
tive ruling elites or intelligence leadership.16 In Albania in 1997,
The Role and Purpose of Intelligence in a Democracy 3
National Intelligence Service (NIS) personnel even suppressed civil-
ian demonstrations against corruption in the government.17
In Colombia, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS)
(1953–2011) leadership and rank and file were involved in assassina-
tions, improper bargains with paramilitary and guerrilla groups, and
electronic surveillance of political opposition and media representa-
tives, which ultimately led to the dismantling of the agency in 2011.18
In Argentina, political police practices, which occurred virtually under
each democratically elected administration but more so under the gov-
ernment led by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, ultimately resulted in
the dissolution of the Secretariat of Intelligence (SI) in 2015, after
allegations of involvement in the assassination of a prosecutor who
was investigating terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.19
Finally, in virtually all developing African democracies, the primary
role of intelligence agencies is regime protection. Uganda, Kenya,
Nigeria, and South Sudan are a few examples.20
The Role of Intelligence 
Intelligence is crucial to the survival of the state. For this reason,
all democracies have created at least one intelligence agency, albeit
with different structures, sizes, capabilities, and competences
depending on the state, its needs, and its history. Although there is
no universally accepted definition of intelligence,21 in a democracy,
the main function of intelligence is to help fulfill the legitimate
tasks of government. Specifically, the purpose of intelligence is to
serve, inform, assist, and support policymakers/decisionmakers in
their work, and to provide support to security or military operations
and organizations.22
In this context, the role of intelligence in a democracy is three-
fold: First, it is a process. Intelligence involves an enterprise by
which certain types of information (e.g., security threats, strategic
threat estimates, future capabilities projections, indication and warn-
ing, etc.) are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and dis-
seminated to decisionmakers/policymakers. It also is how certain
types of covert action are conceived and conducted.
Second, it is an organization. Intelligence consists of units that
execute the intelligence functions (process and product). Such insti-
tutions are
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• civilian domestic, with no law enforcement authorities (MI5 in
the United Kingdom, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
[CSIS] in Canada, the Australian Security Intelligence Organi-
sation [ASIO] in Australia, the Internal Security Organization
[ISO] in Uganda, the BND in Germany, the National Intelligence
Service in Albania, the Intelligence Agency [AR] in Macedonia); 
• civilian foreign with no law-enforcement powers (the Central
Intelligence Agency [CIA] in the United States, MI6 in the United
Kingdom, the National Assessment Bureau [NAB] in New
Zealand, the Foreign Intelligence Service [SIE] in Romania); 
• civilian intelligence with law-enforcement powers (the FBI in
the United States; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in
Canada, the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police [DCPJ]
in France, the Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protec-
tion [DIPI] in Romania); 
• domestic and foreign hybrid (the Brazilian Intelligence Agency
[ABIN], the Federal Intelligence Agency [AFI] in Argentina,
Indonesia State Intelligence Agency [BIN] in Indonesia, the
National Intelligence Service [NIS] in Kenya); strategic foreign-
domestic law-enforcement hybrid intelligence located under the
military (the State Intelligence Service [SIS] in Sri Lanka, the
Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] in Pakistan);
• military (the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] or the National
Security Agency [NSA] in the United States, the Government
Communications Headquarters [GCHQ] in the United King-
dom, the General Directorate for External Security [DGSE] in
France, and, respectively, in Mali, the General Directorate of the
Armed Forces’ Intelligence [DGIA] in Romania).
Such institutions also include interagency arrangements such as
fusion centers—domestically (all seventy-eight centers in the United
States, Spain’s CITCO [Intelligence Center Against Terrorism and
Organized Crime]) and/or internationally (INTCEN, the EU [Euro-
pean Union] Intelligence and Situation Centre). However, these units
can be strategic (long-term intelligence in support of policymaking
and military plans), operational (used by the armed forces, at either
the battalion or expeditionary level), or tactical (near- or short-term
intelligence, used by military units on the ground).23
Finally, intelligence is a product. The end result of the roles,
processes, and organizations is the intelligence product—a forecast
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of short- and long-term national-security issues—which is distrib-
uted to policymakers in various forms (paper, video, PowerPoint,
or a combination of all these, depending on the preferences of the
policymakers/decisionmakers). In the United States, the product
includes the President’s Daily Brief or a National Intelligence Esti-
mate; in Romania, the product is the Daily Security Intelligence Bul-
letin, a ten-page document.
Although intelligence involves information—simplistically put,
raw data—information does not equate to intelligence. Intelligence
entails both information and response. Intelligence is information
collected from a variety of sources, which undergoes elaborate
examination and a thorough reasoning process by the analyst, who
transforms it into a timely, tailored, useful, and digestible product for
policymakers, decisionmakers, and operators, as well as—if needed—
sharable reports to non-policymaking/decisionmaking entities (such
as the private sector). 
A comprehensive presentation of the place and role of intelli-
gence agencies in safeguarding national security in a democracy
includes, inter alia, the following efforts: identifying potential risks
and threats to democratic security (state, citizens), as well as their
motivation, objectives, and strategies; self-evaluating their readiness
to neutralize potential risks and threats; consolidating their own
capabilities of managing crises and crises’ consequences; rigorously
and professionally selecting the most effective ways, means, and
methods of preventing future security threats; identifying those
nations/organizations with similar security interests that are instru-
mental in preventing and countering security threats; and identifying
courses of action that secure the support of potential allies.24
The function of intelligence involves two processes that may be
separate or intertwined: inductively solving a puzzle, understood as
a mosaic, the shape of which is by and large known and which could
be solved with certainty through accessing a specific type of data or
information (mostly classified, but generally easy to spot and most
of the time, available);25 and providing deductive intelligence—or
mystery intelligence—which, unlike the puzzle intelligence, cannot
be totally decoded, regardless of the available intelligence, as it
entails relations, data, and references about people, attitudes, think-
ing, concepts, actions, non-actions, vulnerabilities, and so on, and
not concrete things or objects.26
All types of intelligence have at least seven main roles,27 which
include providing information to policymakers and operations on 
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1. fighting potential conflicts/international wars in which the
state is involved 
2. fighting potential conflicts/domestic wars 
3. fighting terrorism 
4. fighting crime, including organized crime
5. contributing to international coalition operations 
6. ensuring support to humanitarian assistance efforts 
7. contributing to security-related research and development
Challenges to the Intelligence Function 
There are three categories of challenges to the intelligence function
in a democracy; each category “intentionally or accidentally, through
action or inaction” leads to failures of intelligence, in the words of
Richard Betts.28 The first category includes external challenges to
intelligence, for instance, state and nonstate enemies that threaten a
state’s national security. This category also includes political leader-
ship within a state that intentionally denies and obstructs intelligence.
Policymakers may discount or dismiss intelligence products that do
not confirm the politicians’ pet policies—even (or especially) if the
reports have the intelligence right. 
The response, alarmingly often, is the creation of new intelli-
gence agencies that use their information only to support the priori-
ties of the partisan political leadership. French politicians, for
instance, have occasionally created intelligence units to provide them
with acceptable intelligence.29 Against the background of the war in
Iraq, then US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, unhappy with the
intelligence provided by the intelligence community, ordered the
creation of a separate office in the Pentagon in 2002—the Office of
Special Plans, which lasted one year—to supply George W. Bush
senior administration officials with raw intelligence (not previously
vetted by the rest of the intelligence community) that supported their
Iraq invasion policy.30
The second category includes challenges that are not planned or
expressly authored but inhibit the function of intelligence uninten-
tionally. These types of challenges include: organizational con-
straints that lawfully prevent cooperation and sharing of intelli-
gence among various agencies (democracies drawing various types
of boundaries between intelligence and law enforcement, between
domestic and foreign intelligence, and between public and private
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intelligence), which makes cooperation difficult and results in fail-
ures of intelligence; examples include the failure of the intelligence
agencies in the United States to prevent the terrorist attacks in
Washington, DC, and New York City in September 2001, or of intel-
ligence failures in Mumbai, India, in 2008, due to “walls” between
various agencies);31 individual intelligence employees failing for
medical or personal reasons; myopic leadership of intelligence
agencies, which disrupts the intelligence cycle for bureaucratic or
political reasons (the 2001 Phoenix memo that never reached the
FBI headquarters, let alone the CIA);32 and intelligence outsiders
who attempt to curb intelligence powers on the grounds of incom-
patibility with democratic norms (politicians or human-rights defend-
ers in most democracies). 
The third category consists of inherent challenges—defects in
organizational design less manifest to external observers. This cate-
gory includes an array of psychological limitations and constraints
that affect the cognitive and deductive capabilities of intelligence
professionals, as well as dichotomous intelligence priorities (avert-
ing crime versus fighting terrorism, timeliness of the intelligence
product versus accuracy), interests (objectivity versus policy influ-
ence and persuasion), and needs (the need to know versus the need
to share, centralization versus decentralization of agencies)—which
impair proper judgment. 
Such challenges cannot be entirely eliminated; they will exist as
long as states exist. There is no panacea for them. Rather, democra-
cies have to try to manage them as best they can. Ultimately, the
very nature of the intelligence-and-democracy dilemma perpetuates
them. In a democracy, intelligence agencies are bureaucracies,
staffed with human beings who can make mistakes, and they operate
in secret, within bigger bureaucracies, which are—paradoxically—
required to be transparent and accountable.
Democratic Reform of Intelligence 
Finding a suitable trade-off between intelligence and democracy
translates into democratic reform of intelligence—or intelligence
democratization. Democratic reform of intelligence is a combination
of two requirements: democratic civilian control over and, respec-
tively, effectiveness of the intelligence agencies.33
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Democratic civilian control of intelligence is conceptualized in
terms of authority over institutional control mechanisms, oversight,
and the inculcation of professional norms (although professional
norms can also contribute to effectiveness). Institutional control
mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the intelli-
gence agencies, exercised through institutions that range from organic
laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership to
civilian-led organizations with professional staffs. These latter groups
can include a ministry of defense for the military intelligence, a min-
istry of the interior for national police or local intelligence, and a
civilian-led intelligence agency; one or more committees in the leg-
islature that deal with policies and budgets; and a well-defined chain
of authority for civilians to determine roles and missions, such as a
National Security Council–type organization. 
Oversight is exercised on a regular legal basis by the civilian
leadership to keep track of what the intelligence agencies do and to
ensure they are, in fact, following the direction and guidance they
have received from the civilian elites. As such, the legal framework
should clearly define the responsibilities and powers of the intelli-
gence agencies as well as the types and mechanisms of control and
oversight, including delineating what the intelligence agencies can
and cannot do and who is in charge of intelligence, and who controls
and oversees its activities, personnel, and funding; stipulating the cir-
cumstances for interagency coordination or international coopera-
tion; and ensuring the intelligence personnel are responsible before
the law in case of abuses, and/or benefit from legal protection if they
observe legal guidance and directions. The legislation should also
include regulations that allow openness and access to government
information by a process that protects ongoing operations but also
accommodates the maximum possible transparency. 
Oversight is exercised not only by formal agencies within the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches but also by the independ-
ent media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, and
even such international organizations as courts of human rights. Pro-
fessional norms are institutionalized through legally approved and
transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promo-
tion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civil-
ian leadership, thus internalizing the previous two control mechanisms.
Effectiveness in fulfilling roles and missions involves three nec-
essary, yet perhaps not sufficient, requirements.34 First, there must
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be a plan in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a
doctrine. Examples include national-security strategies, national
military strategies, white papers on security and defense, strategies
for disaster relief, strategies on organized crime, doctrines on intel-
ligence, counterterrorism doctrines, and the like. 
Second, there must be structures and processes to both formu-
late the plans and implement them. These include ministries of
defense, ministries of interior, national security councils, or other
means that facilitate interagency coordination and sharing, as well
as international cooperation. 
Third, a democracy must commit resources, in the form of polit-
ical capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equip-
ment, trained intelligence personnel, and other assets needed to
implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any one of these
three components, it is difficult to imagine how any state would
effectively implement any of these roles and missions.35
Challenges to Democratic Reform of Intelligence
In its essence, democratic reform of intelligence entails striking a rea-
sonable balance between effective intelligence and transparency and
accountability. There is more to this process, however, than swapping
out a few intelligence leaders and declaring the intelligence agencies
democratized. Several factors, both internal and external to the intel-
ligence community—some of them inherent in the process of reform
itself—can impede the progress of democratic reform of intelligence.
The Multifariousness of Reform 
A first factor that hinders progress is the intricacy of intelligence
reform itself. The democratization of intelligence is a complex
process, integrated in a more comprehensive democratic transfor-
mation of the entire security sector, along with an overall economic,
political, and societal reform. Such reforms often puzzle the civilian
elites—particularly in new democracies, where freshly minted lead-
ers often come with excellent dissident credentials but without expe-
rience in running a democratic state. In most cases, new democra-
cies must develop new structures and processes that establish
intelligence agencies and oversight. Even with institutions in place,
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“authoritarianism and military politics may continue behind the for-
malities of civilian and democratic governance.”36 The new institu-
tions must establish sufficient legitimacy to be able to undertake a
rigorous democratic reform of the intelligence services or execute a
robust democratic control and oversight. 
And even if the legitimacy issue is resolved, such pressing
issues as economic development, health care, and education get
higher priority on government agendas—and receive more resources
and time, to the detriment of security/intelligence. Empirical evi-
dence reveals that it takes new democracies throughout the world
more than a decade to institute security and intelligence reforms,
and there are still areas requiring improvement, either in terms of
transparency and accountability (all new democracies) or effective-
ness (Indonesia, South Africa, Kenya, Albania, Argentina, Brazil,
the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru).37
If democracies are incapable of providing basic human rights,
freedoms, and liberties for their citizens, or if they fall short in attain-
ing political freedom and pluralism, lack free-market economies,
have no vigorous civil societies, and fail to institute effective defense
and security governance, they, by definition, fail to democratize—
even if they still hold elections.38 As these countries remain moder-
ately or strongly authoritarian, it is more likely that intelligence
agencies remain unreformed and nondemocratic. Recent examples
include Russia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus (early 1990s–present),
Turkey (2016–present), Mali (2012–2013), the Maldives (2012–pre-
sent) and Venezuela (2017–present), among others.39
Resistance to Reform: The Intelligence Agencies 
Resistance or reluctance to reform is another challenge. Intelligence
agencies oppose democratic reform for a variety of bureaucratic,
ideological, or political reasons. Intelligence agencies are bureau-
cracies, and bureaucracies are hard to reform even in a democratic
country.40 Amy Zegart’s account of the FBI’s opposition, before
9/11, to information technology—which was one of the many fac-
tors (along with other interagency and policy-related dynamics)
that contributed to the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks—is a case
in point.41 Intelligence agencies challenge democratic reform—par-
ticularly, democratic control—because they generally lack confi-
dence in the political decisionmakers’ expertise in intelligence,
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doubt that national security is a high priority on the politicians’
agenda, and believe that too much transparency or democratic
scrutiny will undermine their effectiveness.42 Robert Johnson’s
assessment of Pakistan’s ISI, that the agency “regards civilian politi-
cians with suspicion, if not contempt,”43 applies to long-established
and developing democracies equally.44
In new democracies, this resistance to reform is even more
unsettling. Because, under nondemocratic regimes, intelligence
agencies serve a restricted and highly privileged political class and
enjoy special benefits—including better remuneration and possibil-
ity to travel abroad—they are suspicious of any political change that
would do away with these powers. Under democratic reform, intel-
ligence agencies must lose these prerogatives, refrain from abusive
practices and illegalities, and accept downsizing, vetting, and retro-
spective investigation of their past practices and actions—all of
which they, not surprisingly, try to resist. In Chile, during the early
years of transition, the armed forces torpedoed any civilian effort to
reform the military intelligence services that had lingered since
Augusto Pinochet’s administration—most especially any suggestion
of forming a civilian intelligence agency. What is more, after the
creation of a civilian service—the National Intelligence Agency
(ANI)—in 2004, the military regularly used its influence to obstruct
any attempts to grant ANI collection powers.45
Intelligence agencies in emerging democracies sometimes use their
special powers and access to files or records to stall or influence the
reform by blackmailing or coercing decisionmakers. The literature is
rife with examples from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Asia.46
Reluctance to Reform: The Civilian Elites 
Not only intelligence agencies but also elected officials avoid or ini-
tially oppose reforming intelligence. One explanation is that intelli-
gence does not bring in votes. In virtually all democracies, especially
new ones, politicians have other reforms as top priority, which may
bring in more votes—health, education, development—even if the
democracy faces serious security threats. Trinidad and Tobago has
been a democracy for decades, yet it lacks an intelligence agency that
can tackle the increasing terrorist and organized crime threat in the
country effectively; health, education, and the economy have been
priorities instead.47
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Another explanation is that the civilian elites fear intelligence per-
sonnel have information that could be used against them. For instance,
congressional investigations of allegations of intelligence wrongdoing
in the United States in the early 1970s—and the ulterior reforms of the
intelligence community—were possible, among other reasons, only
after the death of J. Edgar Hoover, who had run the FBI for almost
fifty years and whom many government officials had feared.48
One additional explanation for the civilians’ hands-off attitude
toward intelligence in general and intelligence reform in particular
stems from the limited trust in intelligence. This distrust is due to
secrecy, on the one hand, and past abuses and transgressions, on the
other. Not surprisingly, Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch note that
“despite the nod towards oversight, Britain remains one of the most
secretive states.”49 In addition, some of the most ignominious intelli-
gence activities have involved encroachments on individual liberties,
sometimes without a real national-security reason. Essentially, then, in
a democracy, what citizens know about intelligence usually empha-
sizes failures or scandals. Successes tend to stay secret—paradoxi-
cally, partly because intelligence agencies themselves want it that
way, as a means to protect their sources and methods. As a result,
intelligence becomes easily vilified or, as Philip Davies notes, “turned
into a folk devil” and dreaded extremely or “subjected to media and
political moral panic,” no matter how well they serve democracies.50
In Canada, the intelligence community lost credibility because
the RCMP failed to prevent the deportation to Syria by the US gov-
ernment in 2002—and the subsequent torturing by the Syrian gov-
ernment—of an innocent Canadian and Syrian citizen (Maher Arar),
suspected by the United States of involvement in terrorism.51 In
France, because, as one expert notes, the “intelligence culture has
been marked by a preference for action, widespread secrecy, and
political distance,” it has led to “disdain toward intelligence.”52 As
such, the politicians have organized the intelligence community in
France “so that there were in every Ministry at least two organiza-
tions performing similar tasks, and thus challenging the mission and
legitimacy of each other.”53 Additionally, very often in democracies,
civilian elites deny knowledge of illegal operations in order to avoid
any possible suspicion that they tolerate illegal activities and prac-
tices. In 2009, Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the House in the United
States, denied that the CIA informed her in 2002 that it had used
enhanced interrogation techniques on terrorist Abu Zubaydah.54
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Civilians’ reluctance to engage democratic intelligence reform
is even more prevalent in new democracies, because they fear
either past exposure with the nondemocratic regimes’ intelligence
agencies or blackmail.55 For the general public, then, the legacy
agencies are the bêtes noires of the government. Indeed, as Stuart
Farson et al. highlight, “In many transition regimes there is such
a deep well of mistrust of security agencies that anyone dealing
with them may find themselves under suspicion of being a ‘spook’
or an informer.”56
Citizens and political elites typically oppose creating new intel-
ligence systems for fear of a return to a nondemocratic regime.
Hence, in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, citi-
zens actually favored “the destruction of intelligence apparatuses, not
their reform,” as Larry Watts notes.57 In some new democracies, for-
mer guerrillas become the government; because they harbor deep
antipathy toward their former enemies—intelligence rank and file—
who had until recently persecuted them, they have minimal incentive
to invest in actual intelligence and intelligence reform (Brazil, El
Salvador).58 Intelligence agencies in transition regimes lack—at least
initially—both the organization and the expertise to develop the
robust public relations and outreach needed to cleanse their image
and gain popular support. In addition, in many transitional states, the
media, which might theoretically have the means to promote the
image of the intelligence agencies, fail to do so. More often than not,
the newly liberated media in a young democracy prefer to discredit
intelligence agencies as vestiges of the old regime.59
Mistrust in intelligence has serious consequences for the effec-
tiveness of intelligence agencies. Ultimately, lack of trust translates
into decreasing the budget, personnel, equipment, education, and
training, which in turn affects the capabilities of the agencies to per-
form their roles. In Belgium, for instance, from 1990 to 2015, the
civilian elites kept decreasing the budget and personnel of the Sûreté
de I’État one of Belgium’s main intelligence services charged with
antiterrorism—despite decades-long threats of terrorism and organ-
ized crime. In January 2015, Stéphane Lefebvre notes, the agency
“was short not only of lawyers to work on the authorization of intru-
sive investigative measures, but also surveillance officers, strategic
analysts with Middle East expertise, translators of foreign languages,
terrorism and radicalization researchers, and operations managers.”60
Not surprisingly, then, Belgian intelligence was taken by surprise in
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2015 and 2016 when both France and Belgium were the targets of
successful terrorist attacks.
The Legacy of the Past in New Democracies
In virtually all newer democracies, the intelligence agencies bear a
stigma of their nondemocratic past and misconduct. New democratic
states typically build their post-authoritarian agencies on the ruins of
the nondemocratic regime’s ones, more or less of necessity.61 They
either preserve—and expand as needed—the monolithic intelligence
structure inherited from the nondemocratic regimes (Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Uruguay) or
divide the past intelligence services into multiple agencies—a few
civilian, police, border guard, military, foreign, and domestic agencies
(Romania, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia, South Korea, South
Africa).62 Most of the time they retain personnel from the nondemoc-
ratic period in the new agencies and keep the buildings and other
assets of the intelligence apparatuses of the nondemocratic institutions. 
These practices perpetuate mistrust—and even hatred—of intel-
ligence among citizens and policymakers alike,63 with negative
effects on the reform. On the one hand, hiring new personnel is
rather difficult; the population’s loathing of the intelligence agencies
means that the best and the brightest likely will not apply for jobs in
this sector, even if they have the requisite expertise. On the other
hand, the recycled intelligence agency members may continue to
operate as in the past for their own personal benefit or that of their
political party—disregarding democratic principles of rule of law and
respect for citizens’ rights, freedoms, and private life. They may
obstruct employment possibilities for a new generation of intelli-
gence personnel or convey their best practices to the new agents. And
if the legal framework and democratic control mechanisms are not
robust enough to effectively question and reprimand intelligence offi-
cers, they can, essentially, do whatever they want. The literature is rife
with examples of such incidents, which have occurred periodically in
Romania, Albania, Serbia, South Africa, Indonesia, Argentina, Colom-
bia, and Peru.64 Frank Church’s characterization of such agencies as
“rogue elephants” in the early 1970s remains relevant today.65
As a corrective, some developing democracies seek to balance
their citizens’ dual demands for accountability of past transgressions
and reconciliation. The avenues or mechanisms of such balancing are
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known as transitional justice, which generally involves the follow-
ing: prosecution of the perpetrators (Argentina); exposure of past
abusers by opening the archives of the old regimes (Central and East-
ern Europe); lustration, that is, banning past abusers from govern-
ment positions (Central and Eastern Europe); and establishing com-
mittees of truth and reconciliation (South Africa, Argentina, Chile, El
Salvador, Honduras). The formal vetting (lustration) process, in par-
ticular, aims at cleansing the new services of the personnel compro-
mised either by their actual contribution to repressive activities or by
their membership in specific divisions of the past repressive intelli-
gence agencies (Romania, former Czechoslovakia, Poland) paralleled
by new personnel recruitment and professionalization procedures.
By now, all third-wave democracies have gradually replaced their
legacy personnel with younger generations. In some democracies,
nonetheless, the younger generations are still seized with secrecy. In
Moldova, for one, the intelligence agency within the Ministry of
Defense still does not make public any information on current
defense- and security-related meetings organized by the service.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence reveals that purging former
nondemocratic intelligence personnel has a negative impact on the
democratic consolidation. In some new democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe, for example, former intelligence officials were
often rehired by other institutions, with no vetting requirements,
which allowed them to continue their old, dirty practices in the new
institutions; they also opened their own private businesses, thus
competing with the state agencies—as they had greater resources to
procure modern equipment—or became involved in serious corrup-
tion and organized crime activities. At the same time, lustration was
highly politicized. Statistics reveal that archives of the intelligence
agencies in central and Eastern Europe become tools for humilia-
tion, blackmail, revenge, and disgrace.66
Incentives for the Democratic Reform 
of Intelligence
Despite these enormous challenges, there are a few catalysts for
intelligence reform in a democracy, which incentivize elected or
appointed officials to undertake intelligence democratization. The
first incentive is personal prestige and recognition. Policymakers
may seek to go down in history as pioneers of successful intelligence
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reforms.67 George Cristian Maior, in Romania, for one, remains asso-
ciated with the successful transformation of the Romanian Domestic
Intelligence Agency (SRI) in the 2000s.68 A second possible incentive
is awareness and understanding of the threats, as well as the impor-
tance of the role of policymakers in the cycle for successful security
policies. For instance, politicians in Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda
have always understood the need for effective intelligence because of
the surrounding threats.69 Other civilian elites may learn their role in
intelligence in the context of an emerging or past security crisis or
disaster. For example, the United States, France, Belgium, and India
in the aftermath of the successful terrorist attacks of 2001, 2015,
2016, and 2008, respectively, have sought to strengthen intelligence
capabilities to fight terrorism more effectively.70
A third possible incentive is receiving financial support and
assistance, to include education and training, from other countries.
Colombia, for example, has augmented its intelligence capabilities
to fight the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s
Army (FARC), while also safeguarding human rights, as an effect of
US security assistance. Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya have also
strengthened their intelligence effectiveness, thanks to financial sup-
port from the United States.71 Related are the carrots and sticks of
the membership requirements of various regional security coopera-
tion agencies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the EU in Europe, and/or pressure by domestic and inter-
national media and public opinion. 
Although intelligence and democracy may seem incompatible,
they can reach a trade-off, or compromise, via democratic institution
building. This compromise, however, is never definitive. It must be
debated, reassessed, and readjusted constantly, in line with altering
security and democracy demands. This process requires public edu-
cation and outreach—a consistent attention to transparency and
scrupulous accountability—from the intelligence sector; it also
assumes a fairly constant conversation with and among the civilian
political leadership. 
Ultimately, as several chapters in this book reveal, numerous
democracies have developed institutions to deal with this dilemma; the
Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the
United States), France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Romania, and to a
lesser extent India, South Africa, Chile, and Kenya, have been success
stories. Nevertheless, balancing security with transparency remains a
work in progress.
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Structure of the Book
This book is organized into three sections, in which the authors―an
array of intelligence practitioners and outsiders from all over the
world―illustrate in great detail the dilemmas and trade-offs of
intelligence in a democracy. Section 1 focuses on the intelligence
process in a democracy. The authors assiduously examine the main
components of this process―the intelligence cycle, collection,
analysis, and counterintelligence―and illustrate how they interact
to help policymakers devise policies and craft decisions. The
authors in Section 2 explore the broader roles and missions of intel-
ligence agencies and communities in the current security context.
The authors explore covert operations, law enforcement and intelli-
gence, intelligence sharing and intelligence fusion, intelligence and
counterinsurgency, intelligence and peace operations, and public-
versus-private issues―and their relationship with democracy. Sec-
tion 3 focuses on intelligence accountability and culture in a
democracy. These authors address such vital topics as oversight and
the relationship between the media and intelligence, as well as the
challenges and opportunities for institutionalizing an intelligence
culture in a democracy. 
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